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Linguistic Argumentation in Gospel Doctrine
Melvin J. Luthy
Brigham Young University

In my early years I remember being taught that
in Greek the name Peter meant rock. I was told that
Catholics, therefore, argued that Christ was to build
his church on Peter, because he said " ... thou art
Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church." I
also became aware of the counterargument that
called attention to the context of the verbal exchange,
and that since Christ was addressing Peter, if he had
he meant for the church to be built on Peter, He
would have said "upon you" I will build my
Church, but since the Savior spoke in the 3rd person
"this rock," surely he intended another antecedent,
and that antecedent would be the fact that the Spirit
revealed the knowledge that Christ was the son of
God to Peter; in other words, the antecedent was the
process of revelation (Matt. 16:14-18). These discussions were my first initiation to gospel doctrine
being supported by linguistic argumentation. Since·
then, I have been intrigued by the way we use
language to explain gospel concepts.
In this discussion, I am not concerned with this
particular type of syntactic argument, but rather with
another type: the use and analysis of words to make
doctrinal points. The way teachers and writers
sometimes define words, including the arguments
they make about them, have interesting implications
for how the membership of the Church understands
and believes.
To gain a view of what is involved, I believe I
can list the ways we use words to support gospel
teaching in four categories: 1) foreign language
insights, 2) English language distinctions, 3)
fanciful etymologies, and 4) ex post facto
etymologies. While I will discuss each of these
uses, my primary concern is with types 2 and 4,
because in them I find potential problems. Because
of time constraints, I will only address the problems
inherent in type 4.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSIGHTS
The first use is that of foreign language insights.
Excellent examples of this use are found in the
newsletter of the BYU Religious Studies Center
under the heading "Word Study." In this column
John Welch and his associates discuss the historical
meanings and usages of terms found in the scriptures. For example, in the September 1988 issue,
they discuss the early meanings of the word amen in
both the Hebrew and Greek usages, pointing out
that, among other things, the word was "used to
certify the accuracy of something said or written."
Referring to statements containing this meaning they
comment:
Matthew, Mark, and Luke record many such
statements, and such statements in the Gospel
of John always have a double ame~,
[translated] 'verily, verily.' Nowhere else. III
the Bible or Book of Mormon except Moslah
26:31 (where the Lord is speaking directly ~o
Alma) or Alma 48: 17 (where Mormon IS
affirming the greatness of caI?tai~ Moroni~, ~o
statements begin with 'venly. Thus, It IS
interesting that ~esus would call hims.elf 'th~
Amen, the faIthful and true wItness
(Revelation 3:14), 'the God of Amen'
translated as 'God of Truth' in KJV Isaiah
5:16).
Explanations of the word baptize provide
another case in point. To support the doctrine of
baptism by immersion, it is not uncommon in gospel
doctrine discussions to hear reference to the early
Greek term baptein, meaning "to dip in water, or
immerse," from which we get the modern English
term baptize.
These foreign language insights appear very
useful in that they attempt to get at the original
meanings in source documents and, they provide
perspectives that complement our English language
understandings. A similar benefit accrues when we
learn foreign language vocabulary. Although such
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insights and etymologies are interesting, they must
generally be viewed as giving new insights and
evidence rather than being finally definitive.
ENGLISH LANGUAGE DISTINCfIONS
The second type of use may be classified as
English language distinctions. We observe this use
in discussions of such ideas as the difference
between faith and belief, or love and charity, or
eternal and everlasting. In some cases these distinctions are taught as authoritative, fundamental distinctions in the gospel. Of course, many languages
have only single terms for each of these pairs, so
attempts by English speakers to explain the difference between faith and belief, or charity and love,
and then to translate the ideas into another language
will often meet with frustration.
FANCIFUL ETYMOLOGIES
The third type of use is what I would call fanciful etymologies, because they do not make serious
claim to historical validity, but are used for rhetorical
effect. A good example of this use is the explanation
Joseph Smith gave for the meaning of the word
Mormon. In a letter to the editor of the Times and
Seasons, Joseph corrects an error regarding the
name Mormon, and then gives a "fanciful etymology" of the term; that is, he does it for rhetorical
effect, rather than seriously claiming that it is
historically valid:
The error I speak of is the definition of the
word "Mormon." It has been stated that this
word was derived from the Greek word
"mormo." This is not the case. There was no
Greek or Latin upon the plates from which I,
through the grace of God, translated the Book
of Mormon .... I may safely say that the word
"Mormon" stands independent of the learning
and wisdom of this generation .... Before I give
a definition, however, to the word, let me say
that the Bible in its widest sense, means good.
(Smith 299-300)
The prophet then cites how the term "good" is
expressed in various languages, ending with the
Egyptian "mon," meaning good. He then suggests
that we can add the English word "more" to this
Egyptian term and we would have a meaning for
"Mormon" which would be "more good." The

prophet's earlier comments tell us that he is not
claiming a valid etymology for the term, but is using
a "fanciful etymology" for rhetorical effect.
President Gordon B. Hinckley in the Church's
General Conference, October 7, 1990, used the
same analysis of the word, indicating that this is
what Mormons are' all about (Hinckley 51).
EX POST FACfO EfYMOLOGIES
The fourth type of use is what I would call ex
post facto etymologies. In this case, teachers or
writers appeal to the English morphology of a word
as evidence of its correct gospel meaning. A good
example of this use is the familiar explanation of
atonement by James E. Talmage in Jesus the Christ.
Talmage wrote "This basal thought (Le. reconciliation whereby man may come again into communion
with God ... to dwell .. .in the presence of his Eternal
Father) is admirably implied in our English word
"atonement," which, as its syllables attest, is at-onement, 'denoting reconciliation, or the bringing into
agreement of those who have been estranged '"
(Talmage 23). The noun "onement" was used by
John Wycliff in his 1382 edition of the Bible. In
time it became customary to express the idea as "at
onement." In his Bible of 1526, William Tyndale
used the term "atonement," continuing the emphasis
on the reconciliation implication noted by Talmage
(Merriam-Webster 27).
Talmage was apparently seizing the teaching
moment, using the historical morphology of this
word as a kind of mnemonic device to teach one
important consequence of the atonement to English
speakers. It is instructive that he phrases his
explanation in terms of our "English word" and in
terms of "implication" rather than meaning. Had he
been writing in Finnish, he could have appealed to
Finnish morphology and taught the idea of "making
right," or "putting things into harmony." The word
in other languages could yield still other
implications.
Talmage's use of English morphology to make
his point is not particularly problematic for me,
because he said that the English word "implies" "atone-ment." There is a clear difference between
"imply" and "mean." Still, I find that many teachers
and writers do interpret Talmage's use of the term
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"imply" to mean "mean." In fact, this type of
argumentation, i.e. that "atonement" means "at-onement," has become a popular emphasis in the
writings of contemporary teachers.
Still another example of ex post facto etymology
is the defmition given by a writer to the English term
condescend. He explains that the prefix con,
meaning with, combined with the stem descend,
tells us that the related word condescend, in such
verses as I Nephi 11: 16 (condescension of God),
means "the descending of God with us ... " apparently in the sense of "accompanying us down. He
writes that the angel speaking to Nephi chose this
term "to convey precisely the original meaning given
by its Latin roots, con plus descendere, that is, "to
descend with... " (England 45-46).
COMPARISON OF USES
The following chart compares the distinctive
characteristics of these four uses. As the chart
reveals, the Foreign Language Insights give
complementary information, and are often based on
early source documents. They do not claim final

Yes

FORElGJ LANGUAGE INSGHTS
ENGlISH LANGUAGE DISTINCTIONS

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

FANCIFU. ETYMOl.OGIES
EX POST FACTO ET't'MOlOGIES

authority, giving the "correct" meanings, nor do
they focus attention on a specific idea or meaning, or
use English structure as their authority. The
English Language Distinctions do use English
as their authority as they provide complementary
information, and they often claim to give "correct"
meanings, but they do not focus on one idea nor do
they use source documents. The Fanciful Etymologies do focus on one idea, and do use English as
an authority, but they do not claim "correctness" nor
do they claim to be giving complementary information or to be based on source documents. They are
used for rhetorical effect. The ex post facto
etymologies claim correctness, give complementary information, focus on one idea, and use
English as an authority, but they do not use early
source documents--hence the term ex post facto.
The chart reveals that there is reason to be
concerned with English language distinctions
and ex post facto etymologies. To give further
explanation why I believe a problem exists with ex
post facto explanations, I would turn first to some
insights from cognitive linguistics.

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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INSIGHTS FROM COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS
Current research is helping us understand how
we categorize things in our minds. It shows convincingly that the classical way of categorizing
things, almost universally accepted since Aristotle,
is simply not valid (Lakoff 5-57). The classical way
claims that categories exist independent of our
minds, and that we discover these categories by
recognizing common features that they share. Man,
woman, child, dog, elephant, and racoon" may be
placed in the same category, because they share the
feature "animate." Within this category there is a
subcategory "human," the members of which share
the same features, and so on. Classical categories
are thus defined by common properties and
clear boundaries. Other examples of classical
categorization in linguistics can be drawn from
phonology and syntax. In fact, much of recent
linguistic theory is based on classical categorization.
George Lakoff, in his book Women Fire and
Dangerous Things. discusses evidence that contradicts this rigid, albeit time-honored, view. He points
out that if all members of a category do share a
common set of properties, each member of the
category should be an equally good example or
representative of its category. The research is clear
that this notion of equal membership in categories is
not valid. There is a clear tendency for mental organization that favors certain members of a category to
be viewed as better representatives of the category
than others. These members carry what John Austin
calls the "primary nuclear sense" (qtd by Lakoff 18).
Modem linguists call it the central or prototypical
sense. In other words, the categories we sense have
prototypical members. If one were to ask for an
example of the category "bird," one would be more
likely to get as a response "robin" or "sparrow" than
"chicken" or "penguin" (Lakoff 41).
In addition, categories also have members that
belong as a consequence of metonomy-where the
part stands for the whole. Using Lakoffs reference
to Austin we can illustrate these relationships: The
word "healthy" has a "primary nuclear sense" referring to the well-being of the body, yet we also say
that exercise is healthy, or that someone has a
healthy complexion. In these instances, the word is
being used metonymically rather than in the nuclear
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or prototypical sense. In each case the same category
term, i.e. healthy, is used, but in terms of category
membership, they exist by metonymy with the
prototypical member of the category. They are not
equally good representatives of the concept of the
category "healthy" (Lakoff 18-19). Lakoff gives
other examples that illustrate that categories have
extendable boundaries by analogy, or metaphor; for
example, the foot of a mountain is not a foot in any
nuclear or prototypical sense, yet by analogy, or
metaphor, we accept it in the same category (19-20).
Linguists and anthropologists have long enjoyed
showing how different languages divide the color
spectrum in different ways, suggesting that the
language we speak largely determines the way we
view and categorize our universe. Lakoff confirms
that

If one simply asks speakers around the world
to pick out the portions of the spectrum that
their basic color terms refer to, there seem to
be no significant regularities. The boundaries
between the color ranges differ from language
to language. The regularities appear only when
one asks for the best example of the basic color
term given a standardized chart of 320 small
color chips. Virtually the same best examples
are chosen for the basic color terms by
speakers in language after language" (Lakoff
26).
In other words, even though their languages divide
the color spectrum differently, people everywhere
have a sense of the prototypical or focal colors.
In addition, neurological studies by Kay and
McDaniel suggest why we categorize colors as we
do (610-646). Their "theory has important consequences for human categorization in general. It
claims that colors are not objectively 'out there in
the world' independent of any beings. Color concepts are embodied in that focal colors are partly
determined by human biology" (Lakoff 29).
INSIGHTS APPLIED TO EX POST FACTO
ETYMOLOGIES
Now to return to the question of ex post facto
etymologies. Even though Talmage wrote of
"implication" rather than "meaning," some writers
claim that the "at-one-ment" meaning is the primary
or focal meaning. Eugene England, for example,
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claims that most theologian's have erred, and have
encouraged a misleading emphasis on the idea of
payment or expiation (33). He argues that "William
Tyndale, who used the word in his Bible in 1526,
had the correct understanding, and that later theologians have gone astray in their emphasis on payment
or expiation.
Actually, the "at-one-ment" defInition fIts best
as an explanation of the consequences of the
atonement rather than a defInition of the atonement
itself. The word "atonement" occurs 81 times in the
Old Testament, and is almost always associated with
a sacrifIce of some kind, to make payment to make
things right, to expiate, as if laws of justice were
pending. In Hebrew the verb atone meant "to cover"
or "wipe off." It also has the meaning of bearing
something away, as in the case of the scapegoat that
"bore away" the peoples sins (atonement).
Interestingly, the word occurs only once in the
entire King James New Testament: " ... but we also
joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom
we have now received the atonement" (Romans
5: 11). The New Testament Greek term is katallage
(KU'tuAAa:Yll), denoting an "exchange as with
money" of something for something, including a
change of something to remove enmity, which, or
course, implies reconciliation (Duckwitz). However,
the term ransom occurs twice in the New Testament
in connection with Christ' mission.
In the Book of Mormon atonement occurs 29
times, with familiar phrases such as the need for an
"infInite atonement," and the "power of the atonement," all of which suggest a powerful act that
would bring about something marvelous.
But the act should not be confused with the
consequence, yet that seems to be what is happening
with these ex post facto etymologies, which direct
attention to the nonfocal understandings of the
gospel terms. To me it is clear that the "at-one-ment"
that is achieved is a consequence of the atonement, just as many other things are, like forgiveness
and resurrection, but none of these is the central or
focal meaning of atonement.
A similar problem exists with the ex post facto
defInition of condescend, which claims that the
prefix con and the stem descend tell us that the word
condescension in I Nephi 11: 16 (condescension of
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God) means the descending of God with us, apparently in the sense of "accompanying us down." It
appears that this, too, is a non-central focus being
taught as the central focus. Despite the morphology,
the notion of "with," or "accompanying," is secondary to the central or focal meaning. While it is
true that our Savior did come down to live with us,
the central meaning of condescend is to willingly
lower oneself from a high station to a lower one
(OED). England gives his explanation in opposition
to the now familiar negative meaning of condescend,
which implies "patronizing." Most will agree that the
"patronizing" meaning is clearly wrong, but the ex
post facto defInition is also off the mark.
CONCLUSION
In the end, what are we to conclude about the
four uses of linguistic arguments in teaching gospel
doctrine? Aside from saying that this is simply
academic hair splitting, I would suggest that teachers
and writers tend to favor one of the following
conclusions:
Conclusion 1. Each language is unique and
offers its own valuable insights into the gospel.
The implication of this conclusion is that no
single language can convey all relevant, rewarding,
or correct perceptions of gospel doctrine. From a
purely pragmatic point of view, this conclusion
could cause one of two problems: 1) Translators
would have endless diffIculty in deciding which
meaning or perception should be translated, or 2) an
argument could be made that it does not make much
difference which meaning or perception is translated. The relativism suggested by the conclusion
could open many doors to sophistry. If the fullness
of the gospel can be brought to every person in his
own tongue, we must reject this claim.
Conclusion 2. Since the Gospel was restored
through English, that is the language through which
the gospel is best understood.
This conclusion implies that the semantic and
morphological distinctions in English reflect truths
not accessible by the same means in other
languages. Both English Language Distinctions and Ex Post Facto Etymologies tend to
perpetuate this notion, but historical and contrastive
studies give ample evidence to the contrary. While it
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is true that each language divides semantic space in
slightly different ways, there is no reason to believe
that English divides it in the way that harmonizes
best with divine semantics. To assert such a thing is
to perpetuate ethnocentrism, and to justify linguistic
imperialism.
Conclusion 3. Some uses of etymology that
help us understand and appreciate early source
documents are useful; fanciful etymologies are
interesting from a rhetorical perspective, but they do
not help us in making sound linguistic arguments;
English language distinctions provide interesting
ideas, but often fail the test of translatability; ex post
facto etymologies, as appealing as they may be in
English, do not make good linguistics nor good
gospel doctrine. At best they provide an eclectic way
of making one's personal point at the possible
expense of skewing the plain, focal concepts of the
gospeL
EPILOGUE
When Nephi, Jacob, Enos, Alma, and Joseph
Smith speak of teaching the plainness of the Gospel,
might they be speaking of teaching what cognitive
linguists have come to call the focal ideas that seem
to resonate with our very souls, regardless of our
languages, just as focal colors resonate with all
peoples, regardless of their languages. Perhaps the
idea of focal meanings even tells us something about
what preaching the "fullness" of the gospel means.
Perhaps it does not mean preaching every nuance
offered by every language, but rather preaching tre
nuclear or focal elements that are universal, probably
associated with our spiritual selves in a way that
produces a harmony, a fullness in simplicity, when
they are known.
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